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Admissions: What They Are
and How They Can Impact
Litigation
Hon. William J. Giacomo*
I.

What is an admission?

Many people associate an admission with a confession of guilt
given in court through testimony. However, in reality an admission
relates to any material fact and can occur at any time during litigation in
virtually any form. What is most ironic is that admissions are usually not
made by the parties themselves but are made inadvertently through their
attorneys via pleadings, briefs, or statements in open court.
In fact, since everything said or submitted to court is on some level
an admission, an attorney must know what he or she is admitting and
how it may affect his or her case. This Article will examine two cases
that present common situations during litigation where an admission may
occur. In doing so, it will examine the background of admissions under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the various modes in which admissions
are presented, and whether the effect of an admission in the litigation is
formal (binding) or informal (rebuttable). Armed with that information,
this Article will then suggest answers to the questions posed in the
following two case studies.
A.

Case Study #1

The facts are as follows: A government agency (“Agency”) was
charged with monitoring the security and well-being of two young
children placed under its care. The two children subsequently died in a
tragic home accident. Following the accident, the children’s next of kin
* Honorable William J. Giacomo (B.S. Boston College, J.D. Pace University School
of Law) is a Justice of the Supreme Court, 9th Judicial District. He is also an Adjunct
Professor of Law in N.Y. Practice and Contracts at Pace University. The Author
acknowledges the research and editing assistance of Michael Crowe a third year law
student at Pace University School of Law.
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filed suit against the Agency accusing it of negligence in performance of
its duties. The Agency answered and asserted, among other things, the
defense of immunity under the New York Social Services Law.1 An
internal investigation of the events leading up to the accident resulted in
a finding of negligence on the part of the Agency and one of its
employees. In a motion for summary judgment, counsel for the Agency
cited the investigation conducted by the Agency and its finding that an
employee of the Agency was negligent. It claimed that immunity should
be granted because the finding of negligence failed to meet the statutory
threshold of “gross” negligence required to deny it immunity under the
statute. This motion was denied by the trial court, which found that
issues of fact existed as to whether or not the Agency was “grossly”
negligent.
Prior to trial, the next of kin argued that, by citing the results of the
Agency’s investigation and its finding of negligence on the part of the
Agency in counsel’s brief for summary judgment, the Agency admitted it
was negligent in this case. The Agency disagreed. It argued that the brief
did not constitute an admission of negligence and, since the motion was
denied, they could still contest negligence at trial. Accordingly, the issue
is whether the results of the investigation or reference to it in counsel’s
brief can be considered an admission and, if so, whether the Agency is
bound to that admission at trial.
B.

Case Study #2

The facts of case two are as follows: The case stems from an alleged
assault and battery of a customer by an individual working at a
restaurant. The restaurant was incorporated. One of the plaintiff’s causes
of action against the restaurant in a civil lawsuit was negligent hiring and
retention of an employee based upon the previous criminal history of the
accused assailant. Paragraph 17 of plaintiff’s complaint stated
unequivocally that the accused assailant was an employee of the
restaurant, a claim that was neither admitted nor denied in the
defendant’s answer. The evidence showed that the accused assailant was
a 50 percent shareholder in the restaurant, was solely responsible for its
day to day operations, and received not only a salary but also quarterly
draws from the corporation’s profits. At the time of trial, the defendant

1. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 419 (McKinney 1996).
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sought to argue that the accused assailant was an owner of the
corporation and not an employee. This would defeat the negligent hiring
cause of action asserted by the plaintiff against the corporation, which
was the only source of money for recovery of damages. Accordingly, the
question here is whether a failure to expressly deny an allegation in the
pleading constitutes a binding admission of fact, which prohibits the
defendant from arguing to the jury that defendant was an owner, not an
employee.
II.

History

Admissions by a party have been recognized by both common law
and the federal and state rules of evidence and have always been a highly
debated topic. Roughly defined as a statement made by a party that can
be used against that party at trial,2 an admission can be a highly
prejudicial proclamation. Wigmore concedes that even though a party
admission essentially has the same probative value as any other person’s
assertion, its significance is greatly increased when offered against the
party so as to invalidate any inconsistent statements made in pleadings or
testimony.3 In fact, the weight of an admission is so great that it has often
been held that a party may “plead themselves out of court.” After all, if a
defendant admits to everything in the complaint, there is no triable issue.
Accordingly, whether a party’s statement rises to the level of an
admission, to the extent of removing the issue from trial, can be a highly
contentious and imperative inquiry.
In codifying the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory
Committee addressed party admissions as an express exclusion of
hearsay.4 In order to qualify, the statement must be offered against the
party and be the party’s own statement, which includes statements of an
authorized agent, or be a statement which the party has adopted as true.5
Examining the language of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) reveals that a couple
of inferences may be made. The first comes from the introductory
language of the rule which requires that “[t]he statement is offered

2. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK].
3. See id.
4. FED. R. EVID. 801; see also Liberto v. Liberto, 507 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (App. Div.
1986); Fassett v. Fassett, 475 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (App. Div. 1984).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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against an opposing party . . .”6 While this means that the statement must
be contrary to a party’s position at trial, an admission, unlike a statement
against interest, need not be against the party’s interest at the time it was
made.7
In addition, the statement must be (A) “made by the party in an
individual or representative capacity”; (B) “one the party manifested that
it adopted or believed to be true”; (C) “made by a person whom the party
authorized to make a statement on the subject”; (D) “made by the party’s
agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and
while it existed”; or (E) “made by the party’s coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.”8 Essentially, the Advisory Committee
required that an admission not only be against the party’s position but
also that it either come directly from the party or the party acknowledge
the statement and accept it as true. More importantly, since an admission
is an exclusion to the hearsay rule, it is not limited to in-court testimony,
thereby broadening the time frame and format in which an admission can
be made.9
In terms of the requirement that the statement come from the party,
the language was expanded to include their authorized agent or
representative.10 To determine if a representative’s statement meets the
criteria of an admission, one must examine whether the statement was
made in the scope of employment.11 As a guide to interpret what
constitutes “scope of employment,” in an evidentiary setting, the
Advisory Committee has stated that the only requirement is that the
subject matter of the admission matches the subject matter of the
employee’s job description.12 This issue arises often where an executor
of a decedent’s estate makes statements to creditors as to the value of the
estate.13 When it has been determined that such statements were not made

6. Id.
7. See Tamily v. Gen. Contracting Corp., 705 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 2000).
8. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
9. See id. at 801(c). As hearsay is defined as, “a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted,” it follows that an exclusion from hearsay would not need to be
made while testifying at the trial. Id.
10. See id.
11. See Tamily, 705 N.Y.S.2d 109; see also Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland v. Am.
Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Liquidation of Union Indem. Ins. Co.), 674 N.E.2d. 313 (N.Y.
1996).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
13. See, e.g., Commercial Trading Co. v. Tucker, 437 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div.
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by an executor in his capacity as such, the statements were not binding
admissions against the estate.14
Noticeably absent from the requirements of an admission under
Federal Rule 801(d)(2) is the condition of trustworthiness. According to
the Advisory Committee Notes, “[a]dmissions . . . are excluded from the
category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is
the result of the adversary system” and “[n]o guarantee of
trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission.”15 This position is
furthered by the theory that since the admission is made by the party
against whom it is being used; there is no need for them to cross-examine
themselves.16 Admissions can take virtually any form and tend to be
categorized as either express or implied by conduct, and made by either
the party directly or their representative.17 With respect to the pleadings,
it has long been held that statements in both the complaint and answer
may constitute an admission.18 However it is also true that an admission
can take the form of statements in an original answer or complaint after
amended versions were made,19 as well as through a bill of particulars,20
affidavits,21 depositions,22 and the results of an investigation.23
While direct testimony in court can obviously lead to an admission,
testimony from a previous proceeding can as well. Such was the case in
Columbia County Support Collection Unit ex rel. Carreras v.
Interdonato, in which a New York court allowed the declarant’s previous
testimony in a hearing before a Support Magistrate to be admitted in his
subsequent Family Court proceeding.24 Even though no admission was
made by the declarant in the Family Court, the voluntary and
1981).
14. See id.
15. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 254; see also Knutson v. Sand, 725 N.Y.S.2d 350
(App. Div. 2001).
17. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 254.
18. Id.; see also Coffin v. President of Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 32 N.E. 1076
(N.Y. 1893); Kwiecinski v. Chung Hwang, 885 N.Y.S.2d 783 (App. Div. 2009);
Moncreiffe Corp. v. Heung, 740 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 2002); Smith v. Limited, 655
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1997).
19. Bagoni v. Friedlander, 610 N.Y.S.2d 511, 517-19 (App. Div. 1994).
20. See Hill v. King Kullen Grocery Co., 581 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1992).
21. See Baje Realty Corp. v. Cutler, 820 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (App. Div. 2006).
22. See Ocampo v. Pagan, 892 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div. 2009).
23. See Mich. Nat’l Bank -Oakland v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Liquidation of
Union Indem. Ins. Co.), 674 N.E.2d. 313 (N.Y. 1996).
24. 858 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 2008).

5

GIACOMO_Final_Formatted_v1

2012]

6/5/2012 8:11 AM

ADMISSIONS

441

unequivocal nature of the admission to the Support Magistrate was
sufficient in both formality and conclusiveness to be deemed binding in
the Family Court proceeding.25
Admissions through the conduct of a party, while not as prevalent,
have also been accepted. Such admissions arise most commonly through
silence. For example, silence as a response to an assertion, containing
facts which the party would naturally be expected to deny has
traditionally been received as an admission.26 Additionally, in connection
with a responsive pleading, silence by means of failing to expressly deny
a statement has the effect of an admission.27
In a representative capacity, admissions commonly are introduced
through the parties’ attorneys, whether in the form of their written
briefs28 or as statements made in open court.29 Notably, since it has the
same effect as an admission made directly by the party, an admission by
a representative can be devastating when based on incorrect information.
The question then becomes: when is an admission binding on the
party so as to remove the issue from judgment? The answer may be
found in the classification of the admission.
III. Classification of Judicial Admissions
A.

Formal Admissions

When made in the context of a judicial proceeding, admissions in
any form fall into one of two categories: formal, which are binding, and
informal, which are rebuttable.30 Accordingly, the ability to differentiate
the two can have a profound effect on a case.
A formal judicial admission is a party’s own, deliberate, clear, and
unequivocal statement about a material fact.31 Once made, the statement

25. Id.
26. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 262.
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3018(a) (McKinney 1980).
28. See Pok Rye Kim v. Mars Cup Co., 476 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1984).
29. See 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 784 (2011).
30. See Rahman v. Smith, No. 23495/03, 2005 WL 5118512, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 29, 2005).
31. See id.; see also Markus May, A Primer on Judicial Admission, DCBA BRIEF: J.
DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N, Feb.–Mar. 2005, at 12, available at
http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol170205art1.html.
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cannot be contradicted and is therefore conclusively bound to the party.32
Once a statement is deemed to be a formal judicial admission, the
statement is no longer evidence but rather a concession that completely
withdraws the fact from contention.33 As a result, a formal judicial
admission removes the need for the opposing party to further prove the
admitted fact.34
In order to constitute a formal judicial admission, the statement
must be one of fact not opinion and must be contrary to an essential fact
or defense asserted by the party giving the testimony as well as being
deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.35 In addition, giving conclusive effect
to the statement must not be inconsistent with public policy nor be
detrimental to the opposing party’s theory of recovery.36 The
determination of whether a statement reaches the standard of a formal
judicial admission is a matter of law.37
B.

Informal Admissions

Unlike the requirement that formal judicial admissions be
unequivocal, informal judicial admissions are facts that are
“incidentally” admitted during the judicial proceeding38 and are simply
regarded as a piece of evidence that is not binding or conclusive on the
trier of fact.39 Similar to any other form of evidence, informal admissions
are subject to contradiction or explanation.40 Accordingly, the
classification of an admission as either formal or informal has a
tremendous impact on how the issue is treated and has the potential to
determine the outcome of the case.

32. See Rahman, 2005 WL 5118512, at *2.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Evidence, supra note 29, § 783; see also Raham, 2005 WL 5118512, at *2.
36. See Evidence, supra note 29, § 783.
37. See id.
38. See Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Liquidation of
Union Indem. Ins. Co.), 674 N.E.2d. 313 (N.Y. 1996).
39. See 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2590 (James H. Chadborn
ed., 1981 & Supp. 1991); see also Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland, 674 N.E.2d at 317.
40. See Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland, 674 N.E.2d at 317.
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IV. Forms of Admissions
In the Author’s experience, the two most common forms of
admissions are statements made in pleadings and statements made in
open court. These are formal admissions. Precedent was set by the
United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Morehead,41 when after hearing
testimony, it refused to allow the defendant to retract an admission made
in its answer, stating, “[i]t would be subversive of all sound practice, and
tend largely to defeat the ends of justice, if the court should refuse to
accept a fact as settled, which is distinctly alleged in the bill, and
admitted in the answer.”42 Likewise, in Zegarowicz v. Ripatti,43 the New
York Supreme Court held that “[f]acts admitted by a party’s pleadings
constitute formal judicial admissions.”44
While statements in open court can be taken as formal judicial
admissions, the classification hinges on the formality of the statement,
not the location of the declarant. Accordingly, in order for a statement in
court to be deemed a formal judicial admission it must strictly adhere to
the requirements that it be a statement of fact against the party’s interest
which is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.45
As far as statements in briefs or memoranda constituting a formal
judicial admission, courts are hesitant to classify them as such, reserving
the determination for cases in which a “statement totally exculpated” the
other party.46 Again, guiding this decision are the same factors used in
determining whether the admission was conclusive enough to constitute
designation as a formal admission. Accordingly, courts adhere strictly to
the requirement that the statement is one of material fact that is
deliberately and unequivocally offered against the party’s position before

41. 68 U.S. 155 (1863).
42. Id. at 165.
43. 911 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 2010).
44. Id. at 72; see also Coffin v. President of Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 32 N.E.
1076, 1076 (N.Y. 1893). But see Empire Purveyors, Inc. v. Weinberg, 885 N.Y.S.2d 905,
905 (App. Div. 2009) (holding allegations in the pleadings made upon “information and
belief” are not judicial admissions).
45. See Rahman v. Smith, 835 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (App. Div. 2007).
46. Pok Rye Kim v. Mars Cup Co., 476 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (App. Div. 1984)
(deeming plaintiff counsel’s clear and unequivocal statements in opposing defendant’s
motion for summary judgment binding and conclusive admissions). But see 1014 Fifth
Ave. Realty Corp. v. Manhattan Realty Co., 490 N.E.2d 855, 856 (N.Y. 1986) (finding
defendant counsel’s clear and unequivocal statements in brief not binding on the
defendant).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/7

8

GIACOMO_Final_Formatted_v1

444

6/5/2012 8:11 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

formally binding the party to an admission made in their brief.47
Additionally, a court may use admissions in a brief to determine that
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact.48
With this background, let us revisit our case studies.
A.

Case Study #1

The issue is in this case is whether an admission of negligence made
in an internal agency investigation and cited by counsel in a brief
submitted to the court in support of a motion for summary judgment
should be allowed at trial after the motion for summary judgment is
denied. Furthermore, if the admission does carry over to trial, the issue
becomes whether it is a formal or informal judicial admission.
Using the criteria set forward in Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), to be
considered an admission, the statement must be contrary to the party’s
position at trial and be the party’s own statement.49 Based upon the facts
of the case study, the results of the internal investigation and the
statements made in counsel’s brief, which acknowledge negligence on
the part of the agency, are contrary to the party’s position. Likewise,
since the investigation was conducted by the Agency internally, the
result could be considered its own statement. Furthermore, assuming,
arguendo, that the investigator’s report of negligence is not considered a
statement of the party, the inclusion of the result of the investigation in
the attorney’s brief allows it to still be considered an admission made by
a representative.
The resolution of whether the admissions were made in a
representative capacity depends upon whether the results of the
investigation and counsel’s brief for summary judgment were within the
scope of employment.50 As for the investigation, the New York Social
Services Law specifically requires that an investigation be conducted and
commenced within twenty-four hours of acceptance of a complaint.51
Accordingly, the report finding that the Agency was negligent and that
the negligence played a role in allowing the accident to occur satisfies

47.
48.
49.
50.
2000).
51.

See Rahman, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
See Kurten v. R.D. Werner Co., 527 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 1988).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
See Tamily v. Gen. Contracting Corp., 705 N.Y.S.2d 109, 112 (App. Div.
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6)(a) (McKinney 2010).
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the requirement that the subject matter of the admission match the
subject matter of the job description.52 Therefore the findings of the
Agency report should be deemed an admission made by a representative.
Turning to the attorney’s brief filed with the summary judgment
motion, the same scope of employment analysis is required. The
attorney’s job description would be to represent the Agency in litigation
and to present the best defense against liability. As such, the question is
whether submitting the brief with a motion for summary judgment
matches the job description. Clearly, filing a motion during litigation is
part of an attorney’s job when representing a client. Likewise, the
statements made in a brief are well within an attorney’s authority in
connection with properly representing the client. The wisdom of the
attorney’s strategy is not part of the analysis. Accordingly, the statements
in the brief sufficiently match the attorney’s job description and should
be deemed an admission made by a representative of a party.
Finding that the statements in the brief constitute a judicial
admission, the focus next turns to whether the admission is formal or
informal. While admissions in the pleadings are more likely to be judged
as formal, admissions in briefs require more analysis.
Specifically, the first criteria of a judicial admission—that a
statement be one of fact not opinion, contrary to an essential fact or
defense asserted by the party giving the testimony, and be deliberate,
clear, and unequivocal—requires closer examination.53 First, it is evident
that the admission of negligence is not only contrary to an essential fact
or defense asserted by the Agency but it was also deliberately made. The
issue to examine, however, is whether the admission of negligence is an
unequivocal statement of fact. In a similar determination, in Walter v.
Wal-Mart,54 the court found that “because negligence consists of both
law (whether a duty exists and what that duty is) and facts (whether the
duty was breached), there was no [formal] admission of negligence.”55
Furthermore, it can be argued that an admission of negligence is merely
an opinion and not a statement based in fact and thus not unequivocal.
Consequently, in this case, the Agency’s admission of negligence
during its investigation and in its motion for summary judgment brief
fails to reach the strict level of adherence to the requirements for a

52.
53.
54.
55.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
See Rahman v. Smith, 835 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (App. Div. 2007).
748 A.2d 961 (Me. 2000).
Id. at 967.
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formal judicial admission. As a result, it is submitted that the statements
most likely will be deemed informal admissions and therefore rebuttable
through contrary evidence.
B.

Case Study #2

The issue here is whether silence in a pleading binds a party as a
judicial admission even though that admission is contrary to the weight
of evidence as a matter of law. Specifically, since an admission made in
a pleading is deemed a judicial admission,56 the issue is whether a
“silent” admission in a pleading will be considered a formal admission
binding on the party.
The New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules (NY CPLR or the
“Code”) make clear that an allegation in a responsive pleading not
expressly denied is deemed admitted.57 As a result, the NY CPLR
essentially requires a finding that failing to deny an allegation in an
answer constitutes a non-rebuttable formal judicial admission. Such was
the result in Fleischmann v. Stern,58 in which the court stated that “[t]he
Code . . . gives to such omission the force of a formal admission and
makes it conclusive as such upon the parties and upon the court.”59 In
this case, the defendant produced sufficient evidence to establish that the
assailant was a 50 percent stockholder of the corporation which owned
the restaurant and, therefore, an owner not an employee of the restaurant.
However, by failing to deny the allegation in his answer, the defendant is
bound by that admission preventing further review even though this
admission is against the weight of the evidence.
V. Conclusion
Admissions are a volatile part of the litigation process at every
stage—from the pleadings to the closing statements. As minor
admissions can have drastic results, it beseems the competent attorney to
know the effect of everything introduced, either purposefully or
inadvertently. Knowing what constitutes an admission and whether it is
binding or rebuttable may assist in avoiding a pitfall or finding success.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Zegarowicz v. Ripatti, 911 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (App. Div. 2010).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3018(a) (McKinney 1980).
90 N.Y. 110, 115 (1882).
Id. at 115.
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